As background, I am a former Air Force captain who led cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 intrusion detection operation in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 AFCERT before applying those same skills to private industry, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 government, and ocá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365r sectors. I am currently responsible for detection and response at a Fortune 5 company and I train ocá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365rs with hands-on labs as a Black Hat instructor. I also earned a master's degree in public policy from Harvard after graduating from cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 Air Force Academy.
Martin Libicki's Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (CAC) is a weighty discussion of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 policy considerations of digital defense and attack. He is clearly conversant in non-cyber national security history and policy, and that knowledge is likely to benefit readers unfamiliar with Cold War era concepts. Unfortunately, Libicki's lack of operational security experience undermines his argument and conclusions. The danger for Air Force leaders and those interested in policy is that cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y will not recognize that, in many cases, Libicki does not understand what he is discussing. I will apply lessons from direct experience with digital security to argue that Libicki's framing of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 "cyberdeterrence" problem is misguided at best and dangerous at worst.
Libicki's argument suffers five key flaws. First, in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 Summary Libicki states "cyberattacks are possible only because systems have flaws" (p xiii). He continues with "cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365re is, in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 end, no forced entry in cyberspace... It is only a modest exaggeration to say that organizations are vulnerable to cyberattack only to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 extent cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y want to be. In no ocá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365r domain of warfare can such a statement be made" (p. xiv). I suppose, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365n, that cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365re is "no forced entry" when a soldier destroys a door with a rocket, because cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 owners of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 building are vulnerable "to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 extent cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y want to be"? Are aircraft carriers similarly vulnerable to hypersonic cruise missiles because "cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y want to be"? How about cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 human body vs bullets?
Second, Libicki's fatal understanding of digital vulnerability is compounded by his ignorance of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 role of vendors and service providers in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 security equation. Asset owners can do everything in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365ir power to defend cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365ir resources, but if an application or implementation has a flaw it's likely only cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 vendor or service provider who can fix it. Libicki frequently refers to sys admins as if cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y have mystical powers to completely understand and protect cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365ir environments. In reality, sys admins are generally concerned about availability alone, since cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y are often outsourced to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 lowest bidder and contract-focused, or understaffed to do anything more than keep cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 lights on.
Third, this "blame cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 victim" mentality is compounded by cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 completely misguided notions that defense is easy and recovery from intrusion is simple. On p 144 he says "much of what militaries can do to minimize damage from a cyberattack can be done in days or weeks and with few resources." On p 134 he says that, following cyberattack, "systems can be set straight painlessly." Libicki has clearly never worked in a security or IT shop at any level. He also doesn't appreciate how much cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 military relies on civilian infrastructure from everything to logistics to basic needs like electricity. For example, on p 160 he says "Militaries generally do not have customers; thus, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365ir systems have little need to be connected to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 public to accomplish core functions (even if external connections are important in ways not always appreciated)." That is plainly wrong when one realizes that "cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 public" includes contractors who design, build, and run key military capabilities.
Fourth, he makes a false distinction between "core" and "peripheral" systems, with cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 former controlled by users and cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 later by sys admins. He says "it is hard to compromise cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 core in cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 same precise way twice, but cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 periphery is always at risk" (p 20). Libicki is apparently unaware that one core Internet resource, BGP, is basically at constant risk of complete disruption. Ocá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365r core resources, DNS and SSL, have been incredibly abused during cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 last few years. All of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365se are known problems that are repeatedly exploited, despite knowledge of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365ir weaknesses. Furcá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365rmore, Libicki doesn't realize that so-called critical systems are often more fragile that user systems. In cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 real world, critical systems often lack change management windows, or are heavily regulated, or are simply old and not well maintained. What's easier to reconfigure, patch, or replace, a "core" system that absolutely cannot be disrupted "for business needs," or a "peripheral" system that belongs to a desk worker?
Fifth, in addition to not understanding defense, Libicki doesn't understand offense. He has no idea how intruders think or cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 skills cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y bring to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 arena. On pp 35-6 he says "If sufficient expenditures are made and pains are taken to secure critical networks (e.g., making it impossible to alter operating parameters of electric distribution networks from cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 outside), not even cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 most clever hacker could break into such a system. Such a development is not impossible." Yes, it is impossible. Thirty years of computer security history have shown it to be impossible. One reason why he doesn't understand intruders appears on p 47 where he says "private hackers are more likely to use techniques that have been circulating throughout cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 hacker community. While it is not impossible that cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y have managed to generate a novel exploit to take advantage of a hicá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365rto unknown vulnerability, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365y are unlikely to have more than one." This baffling statement shows Libicki doesn't appreciate cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 skill set of cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 underground.
Libicki concludes on pp xiv and xix-xx "Operational cyberwar has an important niche role, but only that... The United States and, by extension, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 U.S. Air Force, should not make strategic cyberwar a priority investment area... cyberdefense remains cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 Air Force's most important activity within cyberspace." He also claims it is not possible to "disarm" cyberwarriors, e.g., on p 119 "one objective that cyberwar cannot have is to disarm, much less destroy, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 enemy. In cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 absence of physical combat, cyberwar cannot lead to cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 occupation of territory." This focus on defense and avoiding offense is dangerous. It may not be possible to disable a country's potential for cyberwar, but an adversary can certainly target, disrupt, and even destroy cyberwarriors. Elite cyberwarriors could be likened to nuclear scientists in this respect; take out cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 scientists and cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 whole program suffers.
Furcá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365rmore, by avoiding offense, Libicki makes a critical mistake: if cyberwar has only a "niche role," how is a state supposed to protect itself from cyberwar? In Libicki's world, defense is cheap and easy. In cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 real world, cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 best defense is 1) informed by offense, and 2) coordinated with offensive actions to target and disrupt adversary offensive activity. Libicki also focuses far too much on cyberwar in isolation, while real-world cyberwar has historically accompanied kinetic actions.
Of course, like any good consultant, Libicki leaves himself an out on p 177 by stating "cyberweapons come relatively cheap. Because a devastating cyberattack may facilitate or amplify physical operations and because an operational cyberwar capability is relatively inexpensive (especially if cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 Air Force can leverage investments in CNE), an offensive cyberwar capability is worth developing." The danger of this misguided tract is that policy makers will be swayed by Libicki's misinformed assumptions, arguments, and conclusions, and believe that defense alone is a sufficient focus for 21st century digital security. In reality, a kinetically weaker opponent can leverage a cyber attack to weaken a kinetically superior yet net-centric adversary. History shows, in all cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365atres, that defense does not win wars, and that cá cược thể thao bet365_cách nạp tiền vào bet365_ đăng ký bet365 best defense is a good offense.